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Abstract
As the opioid crisis continues to claim lives throughout the U.S., tort litigants
have faced challenges pursuing Purdue Pharma – one of the drug makers
responsible for aggressively promoting OxyContin while downplaying the
drug’s addictive effects. Much of this litigation posture sought to recover
billions in public health costs incurred responding to the crisis at federal, state
and local levels. As the plaintiff class grew, Purdue Pharma petitioned for
bankruptcy protection, at which point auditors discovered the entity’s beneficial
owners had caused it to wire billions in opioid profits into offshore accounts –
placing them beyond the reach of litigants. These transactions reveal the limits
of domestic financial reporting regulations and international regulatory bodies,
like the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), whose frameworks narrowly focus
on intercepting proceeds of terrorism and money laundering.
Existing scholarship has not considered why the offshoring of opioid revenues
remains legal in a regulatory landscape conceived to protect the common good.
The soft-law system of norm-building responsible for building these frameworks
would best fulfill its purpose by broadening its reach to include a wider sweep
of capital mobility. The opioid crisis offers a useful context for exploring this
claim. By devising a class of activity – described below as the Public Interest
Transaction (PIT) – modified FATF rules would offer a principles-based
alternative to the existing system’s language and provide a pathway for
intercepting a wider variety of capital mobility with an emphasis on profits
derived from “high casualty” crises such as the opioid crises. By precluding
language that targets other forms of publicly harmful transactions, existing
norms will continue to undermine the public good in a transnational banking
environment lacking more principles-based approaches to financial regulation.
The timing and context of Purdue Pharma’s wire transfers offer a useful
laboratory for making these arguments.
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I. INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW
Opioid addictions have cost thousands of American lives, billions in
public health expenditures, as well as destruction to both families and
communities across the United States. As this crisis unfolded, Purdue
Pharma (Purdue)—the drug maker responsible for aggressively promoting
and selling OxyContin—and its beneficial owners, the Sackler family,
found themselves facing a rising tide of tort claims from across the country
seeking to recoup public health costs associated with responding to the
opioid epidemic.1 The resulting mass tort claims were ultimately
consolidated into multi-district proceedings, prompting Purdue and the
Sacklers to begin settlement negotiations.2 During these negotiations,
outside auditors discovered the Sacklers caused Purdue to wire billions out
of the country and into offshore financial centers, accelerating the pace of
these transactions, which represented a far greater sum than amounts
offered to plaintiffs during settlement talks.3
This Article uses these wire transfers to question the efficacy of
existing international financial regulatory bodies such as the Financial
Action Task Force (FATF). It argues that the soft law norms used to
promulgate FATF standards are insufficient to protect the public interest;
that American regulations demonstrate how existing laws in FATF member
countries sustain a regulatory climate that continues to support problematic
forms of capital flight; and that creating a new regulatory class of Public
Interest Transactions (PIT) targeting a wider species of wire transfers is in
keeping with the FATF’s purpose. Absent an aspirational regime that
confronts gaps in our international financial regulatory systems, domestic
and transnational norms will undermine efforts to seek redress on behalf of
those harmed by actors such as Purdue and the Sacklers.
Had the Sacklers been street-level drug pushers or terrorists
responsible for tens of thousands of deaths, there is little doubt they would
have been prosecuted, jailed, and subject to asset seizure. Ironically, over
the same period of time that banking institutions were being asked to refine
reporting rules that would help governments seize proceeds of crime, at
least a dozen worked with Purdue’s beneficial owners’ offshore capital
under circumstances substantively adjacent to the FATF’s work.
Given their timing and context, the Purdue–Sackler wire transfers are a
prototypical example of a globalized problem that awaits a globalized
solution. With modest changes, the FATF is best suited to regulate such
capital flows, given its mandate and infrastructure. This Article explains
how to institute such changes.
This Article uses the opioid crisis and the history of the FATF to
explore ways to improve international financial regulatory networks and
1
2
3

See infra Part IV.
See infra Part IV.
See infra Part IV.
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widen their surveillance standards to include transactions in which the
public has a significant interest. While these two subject areas may seem
unrelated, early phases of the opioid crisis generated enormous profits for
the healthcare industry at a time when the United States and other countries
were working through international financial regulatory networks to target
the proceeds of crime and, eventually, terrorist-related finance. Purdue and
its beneficial owners—the Sackler family—were among those whose
fortunes grew before widespread use of their products played a role in a
substance abuse epidemic that continues to cost lives.4 Over decades, key
members of the family used American financial institutions to wire
Purdue’s profits to offshore entities under their control.5 During this same
period, U.S. representatives were actively working through the FATF to
globalize financial surveillance norms.6 The offshoring of opioid proceeds
illustrates how informal rulemaking paradigms did not sufficiently account
for the classes of transactions and parties warranting enhanced scrutiny at
critical times.
Early in the FATF’s history, its member states used the “talking shop”
model of engagement and rulemaking because it was thought to be wellsuited to the exigencies of international regulatory networks.7 This Article
looks to the work of David Zaring, whose writings have explored the merits
of states working through a network of global institutions to steer the
behavior of financial intermediaries without purporting to act with the force
of law.8 Zaring advances the claim that the “talking shop” model would
bring flexibility to transnational financial networks and help stabilize
country economies.9 Recognizing the absence of a global financial
regulatory authority with the jurisdiction to promulgate and enforce binding
rules, “talking shop” cedes responsibility for governance and rulemaking
functions to venues where behavioral norms emerge out of a shared body of
informal understandings.10
There is no commonly shared definition of soft law or of the features
linking its connection to “talking shop” as a form of lawmaking.11 In
4

See infra Part IV.
See infra Part IV. “Offshore financial centers” are also referred to as “tax havens” and
“secrecy jurisdictions.” This Article uses these terms interchangeably.
6
See infra Parts III & IV.
7
David Zaring, Finding Legal Principle in Global Financial Regulation, 52 VA. J.
INT’L L. 683 (2012) [hereinafter Zaring, Finding Legal Principle].
8
Id.
9
Id.
10
Id. See also Timothy Meyer, Soft Law as Delegation, 32 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 888–89
(2008) [hereinafter Meyer].
11
See, e.g., Andrew T. Guzman & Timothy L. Meyer, International Soft Law, 2 J.
LEGAL ANALYSIS 171, 174 (2010) [hereinafter Guzman & Meyer] (“. . . we opt to define soft
law in a way that is closer to the doctrinal approach, both because it is the more common
definition, focusing on differences in legality rather than all the design features that affect
compliance, and because it turns out to be more useful for the analysis we undertake.”).
5
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governance and regulatory spheres, it refers to informal discourses among
parties who have chosen to develop shared customs through informality
rather than through formal processes.12 Scholarly views of soft law’s
practical merits vary. While some authors generally favor the concept,13
others have expressed faith in its capacity to constrain behavior just as
effectively as formal obligations.14 These arguments contrast with
commentary questioning whether soft law should be called “law” at all.15
Taken together, much of this discourse is commonly positioned in relation
to hard law’s more formal features.16
There is sound logic in marrying domestic and international forms of
rulemaking in financial sectors. These exercises unfold under the aegis of
international organizations formed to serve as networked gathering points
where participants recognize a pragmatic need to produce effective norms
through cooperation.17 Globalization has produced important concerns for
12
Roberta S. Karmel & Claire R. Kelly, The Hardening of Soft Law in Securities
Regulation, 34 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 883, 884 (2009) [hereinafter Karmel & Kelly] (discussing
expressions of soft law within self-regulatory organizations).
13
ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER 196 (1st ed. 2004) (arguing that the
fear of lost reputational standing through “social and professional opprobrium” moves
national regulators to support trans-governmental networks); Meyer, supra note 10, at 889
(generally lauding Basel Accords (or Basel I and Basel II) and the Basel Committee on
Banking Supervision as important non-binding legal agreements).
14
Jacob E. Gersen & Eric A. Posner, Soft Law: Lessons from Congressional Practice,
61 STAN. L. REV. 573, 575 (2008) (arguing that soft law arrangements “can ultimately have
real effect by working their way into customary international law or by providing the
framework for information interstate cooperation”); Jack L. Goldsmith & Eric A. Posner,
International Agreements: A Rational Choice Approach, 44 VA. J. INT’L L. 113, 116 (2003)
[hereinafter Goldsmith & Posner] (identifying important examples of informal rulemaking,
such as quota agreements generated by the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
(OPEC), the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT 1)); Karmel & Kelly, supra note 12,
at 884 (generally discussing how soft law within the framework of self-regulatory
organizations can harden law when it is incorporated into statutes, regulations, and even
treaties).
15
Goldsmith & Posner, supra note 14, at 114 n.2 (arguing there is no sense calling
“nonlegal” or non-binding instruments “law”); Brian Sheppard, Norm Supercompliance and
the Status of Soft Law, 62 BUFF. L. REV. 787, 789 (2014) (“The strangeness of soft law has
led many to question whether it makes sense at all.”).
16
Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Hard and Soft Law in International
Governance, 54 INT’L ORG. 421, 422 (2000) (“We use the shorthand term soft law to
distinguish this broad class of deviations from hard law and, at the other extreme, from
purely political arrangements in which legalization is largely absent.”); Waliul Hasanat, SoftLaw Cooperation in International Law: The Arctic Council’s Efforts to Address Climate
Change, 23 FINNISH Y.B. INT’L L. 519-20 (2012–2013) (arguing “there is a need to keep
studying these new cooperation structures even if they do not clearly fit within the traditional
confines of international law”).
17
Meyer, supra note 10, at 889; Matthew C. Turk, Reframing International Financial
Regulation after the Global Financial Crisis: Regional States and Interdependence, Not
Regulatory Networks and Soft Law, 36 MICH. J. INT’L L. 59, 77 (2014) [hereinafter Turk]
(arguing that “Interdependence problems . . . present opportunities for states to develop
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domestic financial regulators who cannot give full effect to enforcement
goals beyond their borders and into an international landscape fraught with
systemic risk.18 This limitation makes the globalizing of financial regulation
both pragmatic and difficult.19 Working through non-binding international
organizations to engender cooperation among a network of regulators offers
the hope of harmonizing norms that give rogue actors nowhere to hide their
capital.20
This Article asserts that the FATF’s networked participants and their
transnational spaces have left important work unfinished to the extent that
private actors continue placing their assets offshore and beyond the reach of
public interest litigants in times of crisis. The following discussion also
argues that the most relevant transnational networks have fallen short in
addressing particular classes of public interest concerns and that the design
and function of these multilateral entities fall short of their goals by failing
to capture a sufficiently broad range of regulatory targets.
Parts of this Article bring elements of Zaring’s work into
contemporary payment spaces and make the claim that particular
expressions of public interest considerations have yet to find a muchneeded place within the same transnational networks used by participating
states to pollinate domestic policy. Zaring’s framework envisions how state
agents form financial regulatory networks, and how the core features of
these networks offer no more uncertainty than more formalized, treatybased rulemaking.21 These principles include: (i) a principle for national
treatment; (ii) a most favored nation principle; (iii) an inclination toward
rulemaking instead of adjudication; (iv) a subsidiary principle of
enforcement; (v) enforcement through peer-review; and (vi) a network
model of institutionalization.22 Aided by an interdisciplinary body of
scholarship, this Article applies Zaring’s framework to the strategic outflow
of opioid proceeds from the United States over a twenty-year period ending
in 2018.
Payment systems are not amoral insofar as they serve as the
connective tissue mediating relationships between the state and its subjects
while revealing the condition of our modern political economy.23 The
cooperative arrangements that discourage negative spillovers or encourage positive
spillovers in ways that can benefit all parties involved.”).
18
Zaring, Finding Legal Principle, supra note 7, at 689.
19
Id.; Turk, supra note 17, at 63 (arguing that soft law developments after the 2008
financial crisis may streamline cross-border finance while still struggling to reduce financial
instability).
20
Zaring, Finding Legal Principle, supra note 7, at 689.
21
Id. at 686.
22
Id. at 685.
23
See generally JACK GOLDSMITH & TIM WU, WHO CONTROLS THE INTERNET?:
ILLUSIONS OF A BORDERLESS WORLD (Oxford Univ. Press 2006) (generally discussing how
payment systems were shaped by laws, regulations, pressure, and notions of corporate
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present discussion considers two aspects of payment infrastructure. The
first services modern commerce, usually inside financial institutions
facilitating the transfer of funds in connection with every conceivable
transaction. The second function is tethered to the governmental exercise of
determining individual participants’ financial contribution to the common
good, capturing revenues and deploying public resources in accordance
with established priorities. The state finds important expressions of power
through making decisions about how to distribute social costs among its
various constituents who, in turn, fashion a range of behaviors in response
to demands that their contributions be commensurate with their wealth.24
State and private actors position themselves in relation to choices
about resource allocation through their selective support of institutions,
individuals, operating rules, industry standards, and technologies that
support the transfer of monetary value.25 Fields such as taxation26 and
securities regulation27 are the prototypical contexts in which actors’
interests within modern payment spaces diverge—with governments
preferring norms that require traceable movements of money28 and private
actors favoring financial secrecy to the extent covert transactions advance
responsibility as part of an effort to regulate illegal behavior).
24
See, e.g., Herbert Hovenkamp, Limits of Preference-Based Legal Policy 89 NW. U. L.
REV. 4 (1994) (generally discussing how governments can account for well-being when
making decisions about resource allocation); Sanford M. Jacoby, Finance and Labor:
Perspectives on Risk, Inequality, and Democracy, 30 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 17-18 (2008)
(arguing that coalitions of “middle-class consumers, farmers, small business, and organized
labor” have the power to influence wealth distribution when they succeed in challenging
“the economic and political significance of finance”); William A. Lovett, Transnational
Finance Regulation and the Global Economy, 20 TUL. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 43, 59 (2011).
(“Sovereign states have primary roles in framing government tax revenues, budget
allocations, and the use of deficits (or surplus) as a part of national finance.”).
25
See generally Mark Edwin Burge, Apple Pay, Bitcoin, and Consumers: The ABCs of
Future Public Payments Law, 67 HASTINGS L.J. 1493 (2016); Gary W. Lorenz, Electronic
Stored Value Payment Systems, Market Position, and Regulatory Issues, 46 AM. U. L. REV.
1177 (1997).
26
See generally U.S. General Accounting Office, GAO/AFMD-85-56 1 (1985-09-30)
Federal Accounting and Auditing Standards Affecting the Private Sector.
27
Daniel L. Goelzer & Anne Sullivan, Obtaining Evidence for the International
Enforcement of the United States Securities Laws, 16 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 145-47 (1990)
(describing how U.S. securities regulators must supplement various treaties and international
agreements by relying on memoranda of understanding to obtain help from foreign
governments).
28
Peter P. Swire, Financial Privacy and the Theory of High-Tech Government
Surveillance, 77 WASH. U. L.Q. 461, 485 (1999) [hereinafter Swire] (“The government has a
strong interest in receiving data relevant to its own financial affairs, such as collection of
taxes and distribution of benefits. It also has a strong interest in receiving data to deter,
detect, and punish violations of law. These two interests combine in enforcement against tax
evasion and benefits fraud. Along with this criminal and civil enforcement, money
laundering laws, with their emphasis on ‘following the money trail,’ turn out to be at the
heart of modem government demands to greater access to financial records.”).
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commercial interests and limit wider social scrutiny.29 Predictably, these
competing interests account for some of the disagreement as to the proper
scope of public law’s presence within modern financial regulation within
and across borders.30
Amidst these arguments, financial institutions remain vital actors in
our modern payment ecologies. They quietly do the work of transferring
value in ostensibly amoral processes that nonetheless allocate resources in
profound and consequential ways. Commentary in the popular press and
scholarly writings is replete with narratives catering to perceptions that
political and economic elites enjoy seemingly limitless power to
commandeer control over state institutions and public resource allocation
while reducing the scope of their commitment to the social contract.31
Published stories about the continued and controversial use of offshore
financial services catering to wealthy clients coexist with conversations
about barriers to socioeconomic mobility,32 the sustainability of social
welfare commitments,33 and a hardening of attitudes towards
29
Arthur J. Cockfield, How Countries Should Share Tax Information, 50 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT’L L. 1091, 1097 (2017) [hereinafter Cockfield, How Countries Should Share]
(discussing how “[t]axpayers engaged in offshore tax evasion and international money
laundering clearly prefer the status quo, which makes it difficult or impossible for authorities
to investigate and track their criminal activities”); Antoine P. Martin, Coordinating Modern
Cross-Border Financial Services: No Global Policy, No Global Legal Framework, but Some
Regional Opportunities, 50 INT’L LAW. 467, 470 (2017) (arguing countries have pursued
heavy regulation of financial services at the cost of missing opportunities to streamline
them).
30
Cockfield, How Countries Should Share, supra note 29. See also Mariano-Florentino
Cuellar, The Tenuous Relationship between the Fight against Money Laundering and the
Disruption of Criminal Finance, 93 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 311, 312 (2003) (arguing
that “major players involved in running the system—including legislators, prosecutors,
investigators, and regulators—face a tangle of incentives” that leave our financial and law
enforcement systems ill-suited to disrupting the “larger universe of criminal financial
activity”).
31
Arthur J. Cockfield, Shaping International Tax Law and Policy in Challenging Times,
54 STAN. J. INT’L L. 223, 224, 226 (2018) [hereinafter Cockfield, Shaping] (discussing how
media revelations about the Panama Papers and the Paradise Papers reinforce the popular
perception that the “‘system is rigged’ in favor of wealthy and powerful individuals, and
against average citizens”); International Consortium of Investigative Journalists, Panama
Papers: Explore the Panama Papers Key Figures, ICIJ, (Jan. 31, 2017) https://www.icij.org/
investigations/panama-papers/explore-panama-papers-key-figures/ [https://perma.cc/8ETDX8R6].
32
Cockfield, Shaping, supra note 31; Michael Forsythe, Paradise Papers Shine Light on
Where the Elite Keep Their Money, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 5, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/
2017/11/05/world/paradise-papers.html [perma.cc/TC52-N3G5]; Karl M. F. Lockhart,
Investment Treaties, Offshore Finance, and the Resource Curse, 59 B.C. L. REV. 2663
(2018).
33
Sara Dillon, Tax Avoidance, Revenue Starvation and the Age of the Multinational
Corporation, 50 INT’L LAW. 275, 276 (2017) (exploring the degree to which any mandatory
obligation for corporations to contribute to the common good no longer exists and
corresponding demand for offshoring taxable revenue).
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internationalism.34
Modern statehood depends on the surveillance of capital mobility and,
by extension, a set of relationships with financial institutions.35 These
arrangements have grown out of hard and soft law norms,36 multilateral
processes such as economic sanctions, currency controls, and other forms of
economic statecraft coexisting with soft power emerging from the “talking
shop” paradigm.37 As discussed below, financial institutions participate in
the project of networked regulation while serving their clients’ interests,
which means they exist in legal environments where they must serve two
masters.38
Part II of this Article uses a selection of literature to explain network
theory’s relevance to existing conversations about transnational regulation.
This scholarship illustrates the domestic regulatory appetite for working
through networks to develop consensus-based, nonbinding norms within
spaces that also obscure points of contact between hard and soft law. It also
recognizes the complexities inherent in locating similar points of contact in
modern payment spaces by virtue of their structure and function, which
serve to support capital mobility and modern commerce more broadly. Part
II nonetheless treats transnational regulatory networks, their processes, and
outcomes as generating particular expressions of soft law that merely reflect
dominant participants’ priorities. It also asserts that the “talking shop”
model will always struggle to represent the fullest expressions of public
interest.
Part III applies the foregoing themes to the FATF, a prototypical
transnational regulatory network that has played a role in globalizing
financial reporting standards. It also discusses how American regulators
34
Cockfield, Shaping, supra note 31, at 224, 226; James F. Hollifield, Migration, Trade,
and the Nation-State: The Myth of Globalization, 3 UCLA J. INT’L L. & FOR. AFF. 595, 597,
623 (1998) (discussing links between Free Trade and increased migration, the reversal of
which would stoke racism and xenophobia). See also Jennifer Fitzgerald, David Leblang &
Jessica C. Teets, Defying the Law of Gravity: The Political Economy of International
Migration, 66 WORLD POL. 406 (2014).
35
Swire, supra note 28, at 485. For a more restrained approach to governments
deputizing private institutions based on a “make or buy” calculation, see Cristie Ford,
Macro- and Micro-Level Effects on Responsive Financial Regulation, 44 U. BRIT. COLUM. L.
REV. 589, 592 (2011) (“. . . [E]nforced self-regulation and other process-based regulatory
approaches would benefit from building in, at a structural level, greater attention to both
‘macro’ forces, such as the background influence of power, and ‘micro’ forces, such as the
form, nature, and drivers of incremental change within the interstices of any flexible
regulatory process”); Sidney A. Shapiro, Outsourcing Governmental Regulation, 53 DUKE
L.J. 389, 400 (2003).
36
Guzman & Meyer, supra note 11, at 174.
37
Id. This Article adopts two complementary treatments of soft law. One evinces a set
of promises or statements that fall short of hard law despite being “law-like.” The other is a
principles-based concept that considers the extent to which devised rules will likely restrain
or compel participant conduct.
38
See infra Parts III & IV.
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worked through these bodies to globalize domestic priorities, especially in
response to the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001 (9/11). In each
instance, these efforts purported to demonstrate public interest concerns,
only to stop short of fulfilling the broadest commitment to such principles
where they competed with hegemonic behavior or expressions of selfinterest. This Part of the Article exposes some of the inherent limits of a
“talking shop” system of transnational regulation—particularly those that
conceal the precise moments when subjugation of public interest occurs.
Part IV offers an example of this subordinated public interest by
summarizing precursors to the opioid crisis and by placing this history
alongside contemporary phases of the FATF’s institutional evolution. It
describes an overview of opioids, their capacity to treat pain, and the
growing demand for pain management solutions that began in the 1990s.
Part IV of the Article goes on to describe how Purdue engaged in deceptive
marketing practices to further stoke demand for OxyContin, which, in turn,
prompted a sharp increase in both sales and revenues. During these years,
several banking institutions helped the Sacklers execute over 800 wire
transfers into family-controlled entities that were either offshore or routed
through Swiss bank accounts. The wire transfers continued for decades—
overlapping with a period of time when the FATF was aggressively
pressuring countries to harmonize financial surveillance norms. The banks
that participated in these transactions were themselves adhering to
increasingly stringent reporting obligations over a twenty-year period. Part
IV concludes by arguing that U.S. regulators, working through international
financial regulatory networks, underutilized their “talking shop” powers at
critical times and in ways that would undermine their domestic, state-level
counterparts seeking compensation for the amounts spent responding to the
opioid crisis. This failure of FATF member countries to use networked
power and soft law effectively gave cover to the smaller networks of private
actors, banks, and offshore financial centers that sheltered assets in places
where opioid litigants—who were mostly government plaintiffs—could not
reach them.
Part V imagines what FATF standards might look like had the FATF
been more purposive in their design and application. It explores the options
of creating a new class of “public interest transactions” or “politically
exposed persons” whose transactions warrant closer scrutiny once certain
triggering events occur. It contemplates how American regulation might
have responded to the wire transfers from Purdue to its beneficial owners
had different FATF standards been reflected in U.S. law at any time in the
past twenty years. The Article concludes with a note of pessimism about the
prospect of new standards, particularly in light of America’s recent track
record of disengagement from multilateral institutions and a general
preference for financial deregulation.
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II. NETWORKS AS A VEHICLE FOR GOVERNANCE AND
REGULATION
A. Network Theory as an Organizing Paradigm for Governance and
Regulation
Much of the scholarship in global financial regulation uses network
theory as an analytical device because its lexicon captures the essence of
modern governance and regulation deployed through transnational spaces.39
Network theory is a framework used to describe “informal institutions
linking actors across national boundaries and carrying on various aspects of
global governance in new and informal ways.”40 On a spectrum of laws,
regulations, and rules, it is the opposite of statutory law, if it is law at all. It
is custom devised to fill the void where there are no binding international
laws, but where banking practices require efficient and predicable transfers
of capital. A networked world functions above, below, and through states—
it allows for strategic expressions of statehood to operate in more atomized
and organic ways that are in keeping with networked dialogue.41 Even as
they separate insiders from outsiders, networks also respond to internal and
external pressures that do not easily fit within Westphalian frameworks of
statehood.42
While they may evolve differently, international networks now
function in almost every sector of public and private life. For example,
national securities regulators work to harmonize global regulatory standards
through The International Organization of Securities Commissions
(IOSCO) instead of solely relying on their heads of state.43 Central banks
internationally coordinate their norms through the Basel Committee on
Banking Supervision.44 In the private sector, the International Organization
for Standardization (ISO) figures prominently in the setting of industry
norms across thousands of fields.45
“Networked governance” is not a new concept. Discussions about the
necessity (and impact) of trans-governmental and transnational relations
39
See MANUEL CASTELLS, THE RISE OF THE NETWORK SOCIETY: THE INFORMATION AGE,
ECONOMY, SOCIETY AND CULTURE (2d. ed. 2000); Mark Bevir & R. A. W. Rhodes,
Searching for Civil Society: Changing Patterns of Governance in Britain, 81 PUB. ADMIN.
41 (2003); and Mark Bevir, R. A. W. Rhodes & Patrick Weller, Traditions of Governance:
Interpreting the Changing Role of the Public Sector, 81 PUB. ADMIN. 1 (2003); Scott C.
Burris, Peter Drahos & Clifford D. Shearing, Nodal Governance, 30 AUSTL. J. LEG. PHIL. 30
(2005).
40
Anne-Marie Slaughter & David Zaring, Networking Goes International: An Update, 2
ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI., 211, 215 (2006) [hereinafter Slaughter & Zaring].
41
Id.
42
Id.
43
Zaring, Finding Legal Principles, supra, note 7, at 691.
44
Id.
45
ISO, ISO Today, https://www.iso.org/about-us.html (last visited Sept. 13, 2020).
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started in the 1970s when scholars argued that asymmetric distribution of
state powers could not eclipse the growing importance of
interdependence.46 However, this early commentary challenged theorists to
consider the possibility of international cooperation without the hegemonic
influence of American power, which was declining despite its
significance.47 How would this revised model of cooperation continue
functioning alongside a range of pre-existing international norms and
institutions?48
The ensuing theoretical discourse begat regime theory—the study of
how actors in a specific policy arena develop their own set of expectations
based on norms, rules of engagement, and procedures.49 Non-state actors—
corporations and civil society groups—were also acknowledged as
important constituents within these arenas.50 “Epistemic communities”
would eventually populate these venues as “a network of professionals with
recognized expertise and competence in a particular domain and an
authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge within that domain or
issue area.”51 These communities share four elements: (i) a “shared set of
normative and principled beliefs” that provides them with a “value-base
rationale” for undertaking socially-relevant action; (ii) “shared causal
beliefs” illuminating the underlying relationship between the available
policies and the preferred outcomes; (iii) “shared notions of validity” that
are employed to identify admissible knowledge in the subject area of
concern; and (iv) “a common policy enterprise” that comprises particular
sets of social issues and the policy instruments ordinarily used to manage
them within the domain at issue.52
Networked governance is attractive for several reasons. Expert
communities and government officials can interact with international peers
with minimal executive or cabinet-level supervision, and these relationships

46
See generally ROBERT KEOHANE & JOSEPH NYE, TRANSNATIONAL RELATIONS AND
WORLD POLITICS (Harvard Univ. Press 1972). See also ROBERT KEOHANE & JOSEPH NYE,
POWER AND INTERDEPENDENCE: WORLD POLITICS IN TRANSITION (Little, Brown 1977);
Robert Keohane & Joseph Nye, Transgovernmental Relations and International
Organizations, 1 WORLD POLITICS 39, 39–42 (1974).
47
See generally ROBERT KEOHANE, AFTER HEGEMONY: COOPERATION AND DISCORD IN
THE WORLD POLITICAL ECONOMY (Princeton Univ. Press 1984).
48
Id.
49
See generally STEPHEN D. KRASNER, INTERNATIONAL REGIMES (Cornell Univ. Press
1983).
50
See generally MARGARET E. KECK & KATHRYN SIKKINK, ACTIVISTS BEYOND
BORDERS: ADVOCACY NETWORKS IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS (Cornell Univ. Press 1998);
Oran R. Young, Rights, Rules, and Resources in World Affairs, in GLOBAL GOVERNANCE:
DRAWING INSIGHTS FROM THE ENVIRONMENTAL EXPERIENCE 1:1–23 (MIT Press 1997).
51
See generally Peter M. Haas, Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International
Policy Coordination, 46 INT’L ORG. 1 (1992) [hereinafter Haas].
52
Id. See also Slaughter & Zaring, supra note 40, at 215.
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are loosely structured without requiring formal negotiation.53 Peer pressure
and other membership incentives operate to produce compliance and policy
convergence.54 Networks also carry the potential to morph into more
institutional structures with considerable influence.55 This understanding of
institutions can include a range of informal relationships “consisting of
norms and rules connecting and constituting recognized roles.”56
While it is legitimate to acknowledge the de-centering of government
as a byproduct of globalization, this shift should not be overstated or taken
to mean state power has been completely neutered. Networks can obscure
the origins of power while expanding the reach of state influence in positive
or negative ways, sometimes with a considerable degree of coercion.57 Put
another way, locating accountability in lightly institutionalized, networked
spaces is difficult, which may also make them attractive rulemaking venues.
In his 1997 critique of networked governance, Philip Alston captured this
complexity in what he saw as a mismatch between networked approaches to
governance and lingering, Westphalian models of international law:
State sovereignty is not what it used to be. International lawyers, in
particular, are acutely aware of the extent to which many of its
characteristics have changed. But sovereignty is largely an abstraction and
the developments that have made such an impact upon it are both multifaceted and complex. For all its shortcomings, the term “globalization” is
now the one most commonly used to describe some of them. But despite its
ubiquity in other disciplines such as economics and political science, it is a
term, which, at least until very recently, has been accorded little
prominence in the literature of international law. . . . [This] relative neglect
is highly problematic in two respects. It reflects a failure to address
adequately the implications for international law of both the changing
internal role of the state and the changing nature and structure of the global
economy.58
Alston’s primary complaint about governance networks was that
53

Haas, supra note 51, at 2.
See Thomas Risse-Kappen, Introduction to BRINGING TRANSNATIONAL RELATIONS
BACK IN: NON-STATE ACTORS, DOMESTIC STRUCTURES AND INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS
(Thomas Risse-Kappen ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1995). See generally Kal Raustiala, The
Architecture of International Cooperation: Transgovernmental Networks and the Future of
International Law. 43 VA. J. INT’L L. 1 (2002).
55
See generally David Zaring, Informal Procedure, Hard and Soft, in International
Administration, 5 CHI. J. INT’L L. 547 (2005).
56
See generally William Coleman & Tony Porter, International Institutions,
Globalisation and Democracy: Assessing the Challenges, 14 GLOBAL SOC’Y 377, 385
(2000).
57
Clifford Shearing, Reflections on the Refusal to Acknowledge Private Governments,
in JENNIFER WOOD & BENOIT̂ DUPONT DEMOCRACY, SOCIETY AND THE GOVERNANCE OF
SECURITY 11, 20–23 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2006).
58
Philip Alston, The Myopia of the Handmaidens: International Lawyers and
Globalization, 8 EUR. J. OF INT’L L. 435, 435 (1997).
54
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“those with power consolidate it and make the decisions which will
continue to determine the fate of the excluded.”59
Turning to regulation as something distinct from governance entails
considering functions aimed at engineering desired behaviors among
regulatory subjects. It represents the granular detail that emerges from
governance structures seeking to animate policy choices through
rulemaking regimes. Its configurations can vary from well-established
customs enforced under threat of ostracism to more comprehensive and
formal systems. Regulatory frameworks typically consist of setting
standards, prescribing conditions of entry and maintaining good standing,
and designing remedies for non-compliance. Government’s status as the
ultimate rule-maker allows it to deploy the full machinery of public law in
aid of state goals or at the behest of influential lobbyists seeking to assert
their interests. But state presence is not a definitional requirement. Indeed,
some of society’s most powerful forms of non-governmental regulation
exist in the form of “soft law” structures, such as payment and messaging
protocols.60
B. Finding Expressions of Public Interest Inside the “Talking Shop’s”
Relationships with Hard and Soft Law
In the context of financial regulatory networks, the “talking shop”
model of rulemaking sits at the intersection of governance, regulation, and
network theory in action.61 In theory, this produces networked institutions
with the capacity to support the process of informal rulemaking and nonbinding mandates, but without the resources or legal authority to mimic the
full power of domestic regulators.62
While there is nothing to guarantee an equitable movement of
influence between international financial regulatory bodies and their
members’ countries—or between member countries—participants have the
freedom to engineer cooperation through their network of relationships to
produce desired outcomes.63 These features of international financial
regulation reflect tensions between the respective proponents of hard and
soft law in a landscape where states can only control domestic portions of
59

Id. at 441.
See, e.g., SWIFT, SWIFT History, https://www.swift.com/about-us/history (last
visited Sept. 8, 2020) [hereinafter SWIFT]. (The Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial
Telecommunication (SWIFT), supplies institutions around the world with encrypted
networks that enable the transmission of information linked to financial transactions. SWIFT
also sells software products and services primarily for use on its network. SWIFT has
burnished its standing among the global banking community by developing standard
messaging syntax, which uses a format recognized by a wide range of payment processing
platforms.).
61
Zaring, Finding Legal Principle, supra note 7, at 694.
62
Id.
63
Goldsmith & Posner, supra note 14, at 116.
60

16

Chasing the Fruits of Misery
41:1 (2020)

an interconnected monetary system where controlling risk demands
cooperation.64 Soft law’s skeptics question its wider legal value and its
status as law altogether.65 Yet there are examples of careful adherence to
powerful soft law arrangements, which arise out of strong mutual interests
that transcend national borders.66
International financial regulation’s value as a flexible, permissive
rulemaking culture also represents its potential limitation. Aspects of
hortatory institutional signaling and voluntary compliance that work well in
cooperative climates do not necessarily create alignments between vital
domestic need and the rulemaking ethos presiding over gatherings of
international delegates.67 Ideally, public sentiment and the specter of
reprisals from angry voters might operate to influence this alignment. This
was certainly the case in the immediate aftermath of 9/11 when a fearful
American public clamored for political and legislative responses to the
largely unfamiliar experience of a terrorist attack.68 But international norms
often come into and out of existence without much opposition from an illinformed, unconcerned public lacking the wherewithal to hold their leaders
accountable.69 Part IV of this Article explores this problem in the context of
the opioid crisis by casting a light on poorly-scrutinized relationships
between domestic health conditions, the corporate actors who helped create
them, and the financial institutions that—amorally or otherwise—supported
their attempts to escape regulatory accountability. The conversation
64

Zaring, Finding Legal Principle, supra note 7, at 689.
Tom Ginsburg & Richard H. McAdams, Adjudicating in Anarchy: An Expressive
Theory of International Dispute Resolution, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1229, 1229–33 (2004)
(suggesting that the underlying spirit of international law influences compliance with nonbinding rules); Prosper Weil, Towards Relative Normativity in International Law?, 77 AM. J.
INT’L L. 413, 414 n.7, 414–17 (1983) (arguing informal obligations “are neither soft law nor
hard law: they are simply not law at all”).
66
Goldsmith & Posner, supra note 14, at 116.
67
See, e.g., Jason Hoffman & Maegan Vazquez, Trump Announces End of U.S.
Relationship with the World Health Organization, CNN.COM (May 29, 2020),
https://www.cnn.com/2020/05/29/politics/donald-trump-world-healthorganization/index.html (describing the Trump administration’s decision to end its
relationship with the World Health Organization as the organization worked with countries
to find a vaccine for the coronavirus, the outbreak of which caused a global pandemic).
68
See generally Kern Alexander, Extraterritorial US Banking Regulation and
International Terrorism: The Patriot Act and The International Response, 3 J. INT’L
BANKING REG. 307 (2002) [hereinafter Alexander]. Contra Cass R. Sunstein, Terrorism and
Probability Neglect, 26 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 121, 121–22 (2003) [hereinafter Sunstein]
(“As a result of probability neglect, people often are far more concerned about the risks of
terrorism than about statistically larger risks that they confront in ordinary life. In the context
of terrorism and analogous risks, the legal system frequently responds to probability neglect,
resulting in regulation that might be unjustified or even counterproductive.”). See also Nina
J. Crimm, The Moral Hazard of Anti-terrorism Financing Measures: A Potential to
Compromise Civil Societies and National Interests, 43 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 577 (2008)
[hereinafter Crimm].
69
Goldsmith & Posner, supra note 14, at 142.
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considers how the current design of international financial networks makes
it possible for regulatory defendants responsible for these crippling
problems to continue relocating their assets to jurisdictions where
depository institutions play a role in supporting capital flight. The crossborder nature of this behavior necessarily implies that any public interest
considerations in sending and receiving jurisdictions are too narrowly
defined. This deficiency calls for attention to the places within payment
landscapes where hard and soft law meet.
C. Locating Payment Systems Within Financial Regulatory Networks
Modern commerce relies on payment systems that are reliable. This
principle is reflected in the premium placed on certainty within payment
chains, which are primarily concerned with making, supporting, and
facilitating the transfer of money.70 Financial institutions and transacting
parties make such transfers possible through adherence to a combination of
rules, procedures, standards, and payment-processing technologies. Several
of these rules exist within a comprehensive set of American statutes and
regulations. These include: uniform commercial law statutes governing
negotiable instruments, bank deposits, collections, and funds transfers—all
of which are standard reading for American law students;71 licensing and
registration requirements for financial institutions in the business of
transmitting or converting money;72 federal requirements for reporting
suspicious transactions or currency transactions exceeding prescribed
amounts;73 federal rules for debit and credit card usage;74 and strict
reporting obligations for parties importing or exporting currency or
payment instruments across the U.S. border.75 The foregoing regulations
co-exist with federal and state banking regulations, which have evolved
over a century.76
These laws leave room for powerful soft law systems and other forms
of private ordering; most of these customs operate within private banking
networks rather than public ones. For example, the Society for Worldwide
70
LYNN LOPUCKI, ELIZABETH WARREN, DANIEL KEATING, RONALD J. MANN & ROBERT
M. LAWLESS, COMMERCIAL TRANSACTIONS: A SYSTEMS APPROACH 335 (5th ed. 2012).
71
U.C.C. Art. 3, 4, and 4A (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2005).
72
18 U.S.C. § 1960 (2006); UNIF. MONEY SERV. ACT (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2001).
73
Bank Secrecy Act of 1970 (alternately called the Currency and Foreign Transactions
Reporting Act), 84 STAT. 1114-24 (1970).
74
Consumer Credit Protection Act, Pub. L. 90–321, 82 STAT. 146 (1968) (Title I (15
U.S.C. § 1601 et seq.) is the Truth in Lending Act. Title IX (15 U.S.C. § 1693 et seq.) is the
Electronic Fund Transfer Act); 12 C.F.R. § 205 (2019); 12 C.F.R. § 226 (2019).
75
31 U.S.C. § 5316.
76
See generally Gary Gorton, The Development of Opacity in U.S. Banking, 31 YALE J.
ON REG. 825 (2014) (providing a useful history of American banking); Jerry W. Markham,
Banking Regulation: Its History and Future, 4 N. C. BANKING INST. 221 (2000) (providing
another useful history of American banking).
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Interbank Financial Telecommunication (SWIFT) network’s Business
Identifier Codes (BICs) use a financial messaging syntax for use over
SWIFTNet and other payment processing networks.77 Similarly, the credit
card industry uses contracts to coordinate cardholder-to-merchant payments
and to allocate overall network operating costs.78 Both of these
arrangements operate through banks where private and public iterations of
hard and soft law comingle. For example, private contract terms govern
elements of consumer credit card processing pursuant to issuer and acquirer
side agreements.79 But the federal Truth in Lending Act (TILA) regulates
particular payment disputes between cardholders and merchants arising
from the same transaction.80
Information sharing is an essential element of most payment chains.
The manner of payment—be it a check, debit card, or wire transfer—uses
these transactional details to establish the pathway for the money’s
movement from payor to payee and to determine the terms of settlement
finality. These requirements also satisfy the broad sweep of reporting
obligations—particularly where international payments are involved—and
satisfy underlying policy concerns, such as tax evasion, money laundering,
and the financing of terrorism.81 For example, a $1,000,000 international
wire transfer originating from the United States requires compliance with
Article 4A of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC), a BIC to transmit
payment messaging information across the SWIFT platform, and the filing
of a Currency Transaction Report with the Financial Crimes Enforcement
Network (FinCEN) under rules refined in the wake of 9/11.82 As is
discussed in Part III of this Article, U.S. regulators have used surveillance
programs to monitor these transactions in the name of national security
while pressuring other FATF member countries to do the same.
The operation of U.S. payment laws shows how states use
“informational power” to engage in financial surveillance and to assert
authority over individuals and organizations seeking to conceal their
payment practices.83 The data-dependent nature of international banking
simultaneously suits the needs of globalized governance and regulation.84
77

SWIFT, supra note 60; SWIFT, SWIFTNet Link, Ensuring Technical Interoperability
for All Users of SWIFT, https://www.swift.com/our-solutions/interfaces-and-Jintegration/
swiftnet-link (last visited Sept. 8, 2020).
78
Stephen Wilks, Private Interests, Public Law, and Reconfigured Inequality in Modern
Payment Card Networks, 123 DICK. L. REV. 307, 316–18 (2019).
79
Id. at 318–19.
80
TILA § 170(a) (allows consumers to withhold payments to credit card issuers on the
basis of defenses they can assert to original merchants.).
81
See Barry A. K. Rider, Financial Regulation and Supervision After 11th September,
2001, 10 J. FIN. CRIME 336 (2003).
82
31 C.F.R. § 1010.311 (2011).
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Swire, supra note 28, at 485.
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Both rely on the capacity to quickly gather, secure, assess, and otherwise
manage large volumes of information.85 The contest between regulators and
their subjects over disclosure of financial information has emerged as one
of the most important challenges to power and authority. Systemically
important banking institutions must reconcile expansive interpretations of
their regulatory obligations with the interests of serving lucrative and
systemically problematic clients.86
To what extent has “talking shop” resolved this conflict of interest or
made it worse by leaving latitude for placing self-interest ahead of the
public interests underlying applicable regulations? Part III of this Article
uses Zaring’s six principles to explore the FATF’s structure and
effectiveness.
III. THE FINANCIAL ACTION TASK FORCE AS A CASE STUDY IN
NETWORKED FINANCIAL REGULATION
Formed in 1989 under the aegis of the Organization for Economic
Development and Cooperation, the FATF developed as a gathering point
for member countries’ delegates to globalize and implement financial
reporting norms. Its initial mandate was to develop financial reporting
standards to combat money laundering.87 The FATF’s creation signaled a
response to the combined challenges of capital mobility and modern
technologies.88 These challenges had implications beyond concerns about
money laundering or tax evasion and raised the spectre of economic
competition from “more lax” jurisdictions—or offshore financial centers—
offering the commodity of financial secrecy.89 Applying the language of
network theory, these jurisdictions create nodes of assemblage by attracting
opportunistic actors seeking jurisdictions where they can operate in ways
considered illegal elsewhere.90
Exploring the FATF’s history through Zaring’s six principles reveals
nuances in the way states use networks to globalize their influence. First, in
less than a decade, sixteen countries managed to build a networked
coalition of participants now representing more than 200 jurisdictions.91
Second, this institutional trajectory demonstrates how the FATF, along with
its members and constituents, have formed a blend of consensual and
85

Id.
Alexander, supra note 68; Crimm, supra note 68; Sunstein, supra note 68.
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FATF, Membership, https://www.fatf-gafi.org/about/historyofthefatf/ (last visited
Sept. 8, 2020).
88
Kenneth S. Blazejewski, The FATF and Its Institutional Partners: Improving the
Effectiveness and Accountability of Transgovernmental Networks, 22 TEMP. INT’L & COMP.
L.J. 1, 7 n.15 (2008) [hereinafter Blazejewski].
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Id. at 7.
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hierarchical relationships to disseminate a normative range of financial
supervision. Within this structure, networked power is manifest in
determining which countries participate in setting standards and in the
coordinated ways it compels targeted jurisdictions to establish hard law
regimes in keeping with FATF priorities. Third, this transmission of power
leaves little room for arguments about the basis for asserting authority over
subject countries, except where they encroach upon interests of other
transnational bodies like the International Monetary Fund (IMF) or the
World Bank—entities underwritten and led by the same countries that
established the FATF.
A. National Treatment Effectuates Non-Discrimination and
Harmonization but Not Necessarily Equality
National treatment is a principle of non-discrimination. It aims to
ensure equal treatment among domestic and foreign financial institutions
and to act as a vehicle for promoting fairness and standard practices across
various segments of the financial sector.92 National treatment prioritizes
harmonization over deregulation, preferring that a network’s weaker
members work to improve their standards as a bulwark against transnational
risks beyond the control of any single domestic regulator.93 While the
national treatment framework defined the initial phases of the FATF’s
existence, it grew out of a primary focus on harmonization and working
through members to articulate globalized reporting obligations.94 The
recommendations also focused on prospective regulatory subjects adjacent
to banking institutions, including lawyers, accountants, financial advisers,
and casinos.95 Such an outlook necessarily implied identifying jurisdictions
were considered subpar against metrics in a process that inevitably drew
skepticism once expressed in more coercive terms.
B. Most Favored Nation Principle
Borrowed from trade law, the Most Favored Nation Principle (MFN)
requires states to treat all trading partners equally.96 Acknowledging the
absence of any formalized MFN norm within international financial
regulation, Zaring advances the claim that its “consensus format”
92
Zaring, Finding Legal Principle, supra note 7, at 704 (describing national treatment
within areas such as capital adequacy requirements, international accounting principles, and
disclosures to taxing authorities.).
93
Id.
94
William Vlcek, Surveillance to Combat Terrorist Financing in Europe: Whose
Liberty, Whose Security?, 16 EUR. SECURITY 99 (2007).
95
Id. These previously excluded actors resisted being subject to reporting rules until
9/11, when the FATF’s mandate was expanded to include combating the financiers of
terrorism.
96
WTO, Principles of the Trading System, https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/
whatis_e/tif_e/fact2_e.htm (last visited Sept. 8, 2020).
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effectively discourages any one country from exempting another state from
existing rules or from crafting special rules for one nation to the exclusion
of others.97 The FATF frowns on side deals among member nations, which
is likely rooted in its homogeneous membership of like-minded constituents
who can quickly respond to policy issues without ratification
requirements.98 But this composition came at the cost of resentment from
non-member states excluded from FATF activities during those critical
periods when recommendations were being developed.99 The only option
available for non-member states was to participate in FATF activities, but
this was only possible after the organization was transformed from an
informal, ad hoc entity to a fully-formed international institution.100 The
FATF’s pattern of disparate treatment extended into its assessment systems,
which distinguished member states from non-member states—the latter
being grouped into nine regional bodies modelled in its image. More
recently, the FATF has created the status of “associate members,” allowing
specific regional bodies a greater role in FATF policymaking.101
C. Rulemaking Instead of Adjudication
Rulemaking within transnational networks is “talking shop’s” ultimate
product. As a refined expression of equal treatment and an aversion to side
deals, member countries devised a framework of desired rule regimes
designed for domestic implementation on a voluntary basis.102 The
preference for rules over adjudication is ostensibly consistent with the
setting of voluntary standards, preserving flexibility for domestic
implementation, and recognizing the lack of any centralized global
regulator to adjudicate compliance problems.103 In the FATF context, this
process produced a broad sweep of provisions, consisting of forty-nine
recommendations104 and a set of best practices.105 The FATF’s forty-nine
recommendations cover nine subtopics, the most substantive focusing on
preventative measures, banking supervision, and law enforcement.106 The
97
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recommendations ostensibly comport with the principle of voluntary norm
setting by seeking to establish “an international standard which countries
should implement through measures adapted to their particular
circumstances.”107 This work complemented rulemaking exercises
emerging from other international bodies, such as model civil and common
law statutes prescribing provisions for mutual legal assistance, extradition
provisions, and targeting the financing of terrorism and money
laundering.108
FATF recommendations are organized around themes of transparency,
reporting, and enforcement. They create standards for due diligence in
record keeping (particularly with respect to transactions exceeding
$15,000),109 politically-exposed parties,110 cross-border correspondent
banking,111 enhanced scrutiny of high-risk jurisdictions,112 reporting of
suspicious transactions,113 and whistle-blower protections for financial
institutions’ directors, officers, and employees.114 While the language also
includes proposals to prohibit the misuse of “legal persons”—such as
corporations or limited liability companies—the prohibitions are confined
to proscriptions against money laundering and the financing of terrorism
rather than more generalized, strategic forms of transactional secrecy.115
The discussion below juxtaposes the FATF’s success at implementing these
standards with the methods for securing compliance. The latter exposed
complex hierarchical arrangements and coercive strategies at odds with the
notion of voluntary adherence to rulemaking, as the “talking shop”
approach to network regulation contemplates.
D. Subsidiary Principle of Enforcement
The Subsidiary Principle of Enforcement promotes the idea that a
network’s member states administer and enforce internationally developed
norms within their respective jurisdictions.116 The FATF’s structure reflects
this ethos, consisting of a small administrative operation that relies on
member states to carry out its work.117 American law predates the FATF,
107
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which supports the inference that U.S. statutory norms were the source of
its recommendations. The fundamental principles in the FATF’s first forty
recommendations align with core features of the U.S. Bank Secrecy Act
(BSA) that was passed in 1970. The BSA required banks and other
financial institutions to keep certain records,118 authorized the Secretary of
the Treasury to requisition financial transactions reports from subject
institutions and people involved in transactions for such institutions,119 and
required the filing of Currency Transactions Reports (CTRs) on currency
transactions exceeding $10,000.120 The BSA also imposed a “suspicious”transaction-reporting (STR) requirement for aggregate sums.121
The next wave of FATF harmonization unfolded amidst the counterterrorism zeitgeist that followed 9/11. In October 2001, the FATF issued
another eight additional recommendations aimed at disrupting terrorist
financing. (A ninth was issued in October 2005.) As with the first group of
recommendations, these also mirrored pre-existing U.S. regulations.
Additionally, Congress quickly passed the Uniting and Strengthening
America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and
Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 (USA PATRIOT Act, 2001)122 which,
among other things, expanded financial reporting requirements (under Title
III). This paralleled the hasty passage of UN Resolution 1373, which
obligated countries to “freeze and seize” assets of people and organizations
accused of having links to terrorists or terrorist activities.123 These changes
sought to expand reporting requirements across the global financial
system.124
E. Enforcement Through Peer Review Does Not Necessarily Promote
Equality
Enforcement through peer review contemplates supervising network
and non-network members as they implement standards at national and
subnational levels, sometimes with the technical assistance of outside
entities.125 While the FATF has formulated a system of review reflecting
similar values, the outcome produced a less “voluntary” system of
recommendations than Zaring’s network-based rulemaking envisions. In
118
31 C.F.R. § 5312(a)(2) (2003) (Financial institutions include, but are not limited to,
banks and depository institutions, broker-dealers and investment companies.).
119
31 C.F.R. § 5313(a) (2003).
120
31 C.F.R. § 1010.311–14 (2011).
121
31 C.F.R § 1020.320 (2011).
122
Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT ACT) Act of 2001, H.R. 3162 (107th
Cong. 2001–2002).
123
S.C. Res. 1373, (Sept. 28, 2001).
124
Mark Pieth, The Harmonization of Law Against Economic Crime, 1 EUR. J.L. REFORM
527 (1999) [hereinafter Pieth].
125
Zaring, Finding Legal Principle, supra note 7, at 711.
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1998, the FATF began working through its member states to assess each
other in light of best practices set out in its forty-nine recommendations.126
Member countries started “blacklisting” Non-Cooperative Countries and
Territories (NCCTs) for failing to comply with the FATF’s
recommendations.127 If these designations failed to induce compliance, the
FATF could consider other measures, such as banning certain financial
transactions with business entities resident in the non-compliant
jurisdictions.128
FATF assessors use a comprehensive review protocol to: (i) determine
compliance with recommendations; and (ii) review the effectiveness of
domestic statutory regimes.129 The assessment methodology consists of two
elements. The first “addresses the specific requirements of the FATF
Recommendations, principally as they relate to the relevant legal and
institutional framework of the country, and the powers and procedures of
the competent authorities.”130 The second emphasizes outcomes and
considers “the adequacy of the implementation of the FATF
Recommendations, and identifies the extent to which a country achieves a
defined set of outcomes that are central to a robust Anti-Money Laundering
and Combating the Financing of Terrorism (AML/CFT) system.”131
At the national level, the FATF’s technical guidance looks for
structural hallmarks of good governance, such as “political stability; a highlevel commitment to address AML/CFT issues; stable institutions with
accountability, integrity, and transparency; the rule of law; and a capable,
independent and efficient judicial system.”132 Assessors are also encouraged
to use a contextualized approach to understanding the level of compliance
with its standards.133 This approach accounts for variables such as the state
of a particular country’s financial sector in relation to its overall economy,
the kinds of financial institutions or products common in that sector, the
ratio of domestic to cross-border business, and the extent of interaction with
“high risk” jurisdictions where compliance with FATF standards is
126

FATF,
FATF
Members
and
Observers,
http://www.fatfgafi.org/about/membersandobservers/#d.en.3147 (last visited Sept. 8, 2020).
127
Sanaa Ahmed, The Politics of Financial Regulation, 11 SOCIO-LEGAL REV. 61, 66
(2015) [hereinafter Ahmed] (explaining how countries on the FATF’s black list find it hard
to pay trading partners, thereby limiting the capacity to import goods); Blazejewski, supra
note 88, at 18.
128
Blazejewski, supra note 88, at 18.
129
FATF, Methodology for Assessing Technical Compliance with the FATF
Recommendations and the Effectiveness of Aml/Cft Systems at 5, http://www.fatfgafi.org/media/fatf/documents/methodology/FATF%20Methodology%2022%20Feb%20201
3.pdf.
130
Id.
131
Id.
132
Id. at 7.
133
Id.

25

Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business

41:1 (2020)

relatively low.134
Three themes emerge from the FATF’s structure and function. The
first recognizes a separation of insiders and outsiders during the FATF’s
standard-setting phase, followed by a belated inclusion of “secondary”
actors once most of the formative work was complete.135 The second
acknowledges the specter of hegemony growing out of relationships
between the assessors and those countries under scrutiny.136 The third
inference traces an uneven allocation of power and authority inside these
networks as is evident in member states’ capacity to secure compliance
under threat of blacklisting or more serious sanctions. The practice of
“talking shop” passes through all of these sorting arrangements. Parties
with more power are constantly finding ways to exert their influence over
those with less, demonstrating how rulemaking does not instinctively
prescribe egalitarianism or reveal internal allocations of power to outsiders.
F. Network Governance
As discussed in Part II of this Article, networked governance entails
private and governmental units working with their counterparts in other
countries across national boundaries.137
. . . Two implications of the ﬁt between networks and globalization are
particularly worth noting. First, thinking about globalization from a
disaggregated, networked perspective challenges claims about
homogenization and centralization of power and allows for at least the
possibility of continuing diversity in implementing common standards. But
second, where traditional power relations continue to operate, as they surely
must, they must now operate in a networked rather than a centralized
context.138
Another scholar has captured the effects of this process as it applies to
the FATF’s development into an institution whose country evaluation
procedures evolved into instruments of peer pressure:
Originally an ad hoc structure that collected the pre-existing rules on
the prevention and repression of money laundering from the Basle
Statement of Principles (on due diligence in the financial sector) and the
1988 Vienna Convention (on criminalization of money laundering and
forfeiture), the FATF rapidly developed into an institution, for the first time
134

Id.
FATF, History of the FATF, https://www.fatf-gafi.org/about/historyofthefatf/ (last
visited Sept. 8, 2020) (There were sixteen countries in the FATF structure. This number
grew to twenty-eight by 1992 and reached thirty-one in 2000. There are currently thirty-nine
member countries.).
136
Chris Brummer, How International Financial Law Works (And How It Doesn’t), 99
GEO. L.J. 257, 304 (2011) [hereinafter Brummer] (discussing the “democratic deficits”
existing within the design of international standard-setting bodies).
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Zaring, Finding Legal Principle, supra, note 7, at 713.
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Slaughter & Zaring, supra note 40, at 218.
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managing to regulate and to push implementation of an entire area of law
on a world-wide basis in less than ten years.139
By their very nature, governance exercises require participants to form
hierarchical relationships. But such relationships do not form easily, often
taking shape where sovereignty assertions collide with coercive expressions
of power expressed through the fear of ostracism.140 Locating sources of
authority and challenging power is no easy task for the targets of networked
regulation—a particularly sensitive topic for jurisdictions with colonial
histories.141 The various scholarly treatments of authority vary from
something that implies a public “surrender of private judgment”142 to the
subject’s willingness to acknowledge that its supervising entity is somehow
“entitled to obedience.”143 These understandings of authority imply a way
to publicly identify sources of authority as well as the rules determining
their application to subjects.144
Although the FATF has convinced 200 countries and jurisdictions to
adopt its standards,145 the organization itself has also faced governance
challenges.146 As the FATF sought to establish more formal partnerships
with the IMF, the latter entity was critical of the NCCT model because it
held non-member countries to a higher assessment standard than countries
within the FATF membership.147 The IMF was especially concerned about
the disparate treatment of developing economies.148 These particular
jurisdictions were already subject to pre-existing oversights through the
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Pieth, supra note 124, at 531.
SLAUGHTER, supra note 13, at 196.
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Ahmed, supra note 127, at 82 (“The norms of transparency and accountability
essential to good governance are severely lacking in the global financial regulation project.
Recent scholarship has stripped economic regulation of its apolitical, technical pretensions
and discovered a disturbing proclivity towards colonial domination through economic
means. How different is financial regulation?”). See also Brummer, supra note 136.
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See generally PRIVATE AUTHORITY AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS (A. Claire Cutler et
al. eds., 1999).
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R.B. Friedman, On the Concept of Authority in Political Philosophy, in AUTHORITY
64, 56–91 (Joseph Raz ed., 1990). See also BRUCE LINCOLN, AUTHORITY: CONSTRUCTION
AND CORROSION (1st ed. 1994); Joseph Raz, Introduction, in AUTHORITY 1–19 (Joseph Raz
ed., 1990).
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Friedman, supra note 143, at 69.
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FATF, Who We Are, https://www.fatf-gafi.org/about/whoweare/ (last visited Sept. 11,
2020).
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Blazejewski, supra note 88, at 44.
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Id. at 54-55.
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Id. at 46 n.249 (quoting Ruth W. Grant & Robert O. Keohane, Accountability and
Abuses of Power in World Politics, 99 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 29, 29 (2005) “Accountability
presupposes a relationship between power-wielders and those holding them accountable
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Report on the Observance of Standards and Codes (ROSC).149 Developed
by the IMF’s Financial Sector Assessment Program (FSAP) and the World
Bank, ROSC was designed to assess countries against twelve benchmarks
with a view towards improving their financial systems.150 NCCT protocols
conflicted with ROSC models in three respects. The ROSC procedures: (i)
provided a right of reply whereas NCCT protocols did not; (ii) considered
the various stages of economic development across subject countries; and
(iii) took into account the progress of subject countries toward becoming
fully compliant with desired norms.151 The FATF eventually modified its
NCCT process by taking on more adjudicative features.152
The IMF, along with the World Bank, eventually worked to resolve
conflicts between the FATF and developing countries. These efforts led to
the creation of the Caribbean Financial Action Task Force (CFATF), the
oldest regional body.153 Formed in 1990, the CFATF opposed FATF
recommendations targeting offshore financial centers in the Caribbean.154
The CFATF adopted its own nineteen recommendations, known as the
Aruba Recommendations, which it felt better reflected the region’s
needs.155 Although it submitted to FATF assessment processes, the CFATF
demanded that its own nineteen recommendations be used in the
exercise.156 By 2003, the FATF—with IMF support—invited the CFATF to
participate in the review of its recommendations. Only after this process
was complete did the CFATF express its willingness to unconditionally
accept revised recommendations.157 The CFATF is now an associate
member of the FATF.
G. Leveraging Existing Networks as Instruments of Transnational Power
Through the FATF, the United States and its allies have successfully
used disaggregated soft power to globalize financial reporting standards.
Despite this power’s varying degrees of coercion, its harmonizing effects
have brought a measure of consistency to our international financial
networks, contributing to the effort to reduce systemic risk. Even with its
149
Id. at 31 n.149 (These areas include accounting, auditing, banking supervision,
corporate governance, data dissemination, fiscal transparency, insolvency and creditor
rights, insurance supervision, monetary and financial policy transparency, payments
systems, securities regulation, and money laundering and the financing of terrorism.). See
IMF, Standards and Codes, http://www.imf.org/external/standards/index.htm (accessed
October 23, 2009).
150
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imperfections, the FATF may be the space where transnational financial
networks might devise new rules that target regulatory subjects outside the
spheres of terrorist finance or money laundering; yet, it may nonetheless
attract limits on the free movement of its assets, owing to disputes in which
there is a compelling public interest. Part IV uses recent opioid litigation as
the basis for exploring this argument.
IV. OPIOID LITIGATION DEFENDANTS AND THEIR TRAIL OF
INTERNATIONAL WIRE TRANSFERS
This Part describes the Opioid crisis in detail in order to demonstrate
the magnitude of the harm, as well as the incredible and continuing harm,
caused by a failure to properly regulate untraceable offshore wire transfers
that, as a result, may be unreachable by plaintiffs.
A. Locating Profiteers (and Their Profits) Amidst a Complex Crisis
As the opioid crisis continues to take its human and financial toll on
Americans, relationships between its profiteers and their banking
institutions have passed without much comment. This oversight is all the
more striking given the size and complexity of the litigation as well as the
scale of profit-making that was inured to the benefit of drug manufacturers
and their beneficial owners.158 Naturally, the plaintiffs seek to recover
billions in opioid-related public health expenditures from the companies
that made these drugs. More specifically, the plaintiffs allege these drug
makers were aggressive and deceptive in marketing these drugs to
healthcare-provider consumers while downplaying or denying their
addictive qualities. Disagreement exists regarding how to interpret “vectorbased” arguments, which revolve around the idea that prescribing opioids to
treat legitimate pain management is a kind of “gateway” for patients who
would become addicted and eventually seek out alternative drugs once
denied access to originally-prescribed medications.159 Recent scholarship
questions the merits of pursuing civil or criminal proceedings against

158
A “beneficial owner” refers to any natural person who ultimately owns or controls a
legal entity or arrangement, such as a corporation or a trust.
159
Nicolas P. Terry, The Opioid Litigation Unicorn, 70 S. C. L. REV. 637, 652 (2019)
[hereinafter Terry] (arguing that the vector model is a “simple cause and effect model to
explain a far more complex problem” that should center on social determinants of health,
such as “overlapping social structures and economic systems that are responsible for most
health inequities.”). See Patricia Zettler, Margaret Foster Riley & Aaron S. Kesselheim,
Implementing a Public Health Perspective in FDA Drug Regulation, 73 FOOD & DRUG L.J.
221, 235 (2018) [hereinafter Zettler, et al.] (This view supports the inference of the vector
theory.) (“In 2016, forty percent of all opioid related deaths in the U.S., roughly 16,000
people, were due to prescription opioids. An estimated two million people misuse or are
dependent on prescription opioids. Many of the individuals who have moved on to stronger
illicit drugs like heroin and fentanyl began by misusing prescription opioids.”).
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manufacturers instead of prioritizing systemic reform.160 It further suggests
that blaming manufacturers supports a narrative that eclipses responsibility
borne by other participants in the drug supply chain.161 Another line of
discussion contrasts historical claims against tobacco companies (that
operated in unregulated markets) with more contemporary opioid litigation
posture in an industry where extensive regulatory approvals could afford
important tort defenses.162 Commentary has also focused on changes to
federal drug approval mechanisms that might impact supply-side
behavior.163
The foregoing arguments continue against the backdrop of a
staggering death toll and enormous public costs incurred in responding to
this crisis. About 450,000 Americans died from opioid overdoses between
1999 and 2018.164 In the five-year period between 2013 and 2018, the
federal government spent $129 billion on law enforcement and treatment
initiatives.165 This amount does not include state and local expenditures,
which account for most of the plaintiffs participating in opioid litigation
across the country.166 Nor does it account for derivative economic impacts,
such as diminished labor participation, increased child welfare costs, and
lost tax revenues, which some estimate would bring the total cost closer to
$504 billion.167
B. Opioids and the Evolution of Markets for Pain Management
Medications
Derived from the opium poppy, opioids bind receptors in the body that
160

Terry, supra note 159, at 651 (arguing that tort litigation promotes blame rather than
systemic reform). See also Abbe R. Gluck, Ashley Hall & Gregory Curfman, Civil Litigation
& the Opioid Epidemic: The Role of Courts in a National Health Crisis, 46 J. L. MED. &
ETHICS 351, 351 (2018).
161
Terry, supra note 159, at 649–51 (suggesting that the current litigation posture
detracts attention from the opioid epidemic’s contemporary features insofar as they have
changed since the period bracketed as the drug manufacturer’s misconduct).
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See Micah L. Berman, Using Opioid Settlement Proceeds for Public Health: Lessons
from the Tobacco Experience, 67 U. KAN. L. REV. 1029, 1034 (2019).
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Zettler, et al., supra note 159, at 235 (suggesting population data, such as provider
and patient behavior, figure more prominently in the Food & Drug Administration’s
approval and withdrawal decisions).
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Three Waves of Opioid Deaths, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION,
https://www.cdc.gov/drugoverdose/epidemic/index.html.
165
Economic Aspects of the Opioid Crisis: Hearing Before the J. Econ. Comm., 115th
Cong., 6 (2017) (statement of Lisa N. Sacco, Crime Policy Analyst, Congressional Research
Service, Library of Congress), https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/TE/TE10017
[hereinafter Sacco Statement].
166
Id.
167
Darlene Superville, White House Says Opioid Crisis Cost $504 Billion in 2015, Much
Higher
Than
Once
Thought,
PBS NEWS
HOUR
(Nov.
20,
2017),
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help regulate pain and emotions. A wide range of medications use opioid
analgesics to relieve acute pain by “action on the μ opioid receptor—the
major analgesic opioid receptor expressed throughout the nervous
system.”168 Since Friedrich Sertürner successfully isolated morphine from
crude opium in 1803, there has been a steady increase in the varieties of
opioid analgesics, chemical composition, means of administration, and
abilities to bind to opioid receptors.169 The duration of effects vary within
this class of drugs—either because of “intrinsic properties of the opioid
molecule” or “pharmaceutical formulation.”170
Although opioids have been available in the United States since the
nineteenth century, the 1990s marked a turning point in demand for the pain
management solutions in the healthcare marketplace.171 Much of this
demand was rooted in the challenges of treating pain. One group of authors
described the problem succinctly:
Pain is the perception manifest from nociceptive stimuli in internal
tissues and external insults detected by peripheral sensors in the body. It is a
complex physiologic process, involving many different forms of pain
encoded by a number of neural circuits. Pain may be expressed in numerous
forms, for example, stabbing, pricking, burning or aching, and may also
produce diverse emotions and sensations. Pain also arises in multiple
clinical contexts, and each context, and sometimes each individual patient,
raises specific issues that need to be addressed in distinct ways.172
Pain’s emergence as an important clinical concern centered on
problems with it being largely under-assessed, under-treated, and
unnoticed.173 As patient advocates increased pressure on healthcare systems
to treat pain symptoms with opioids, they relied on a small and frequently
cited body of contemporary literature suggesting the risk of addiction is
low.174 These arguments gained considerable support in 1995 when Dr.
James Campbell famously outlined arguments for treating pain as a fifth
“vital sign” during his Presidential Address to the American Pain Society
168
NATIONAL ACADEMIES OF SCIENCES, ENGINEERING AND MEDICINE, PAIN
MANAGEMENT AND THE OPIOID EPIDEMIC: BALANCING SOCIETAL AND INDIVIDUAL BENEFITS
AND RISKS OF PRESCRIPTION OPIOID USE 53 (Richard J. Bonnie, Morgan A. Ford & Jonathan
K. Phillips eds., 2017), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK458660/pdf/Bookshelf_
NBK458660.pdf [hereinafter NAS REPORT].
169
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Sacco Statement, supra note 165.
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Zettler et al., supra note 159, at 225.
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Id. at 225–26.
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Russell K. Portenoy & Kathleen M. Foley, Chronic Use of Opioid Analgesics in Nonmalignant Pain: Report of 38 Cases, 25 PAIN 171 (1986) (arguing prescribing opioids to
treat non-cancer related pain could be safe); Jane Porter & Hershel Jick, Addiction Rare in
Patients Treated with Narcotics, 302 NEW ENG. J. MED. 123 (1980) (arguing that evidence of
addiction was rare in a review of hospitalized patients with no prior history of addiction).
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(APS).175 Campbell’s concept of devising pain management metrics quickly
gained traction, prompting the APS to develop pain evaluation systems for
use in assessing vital signs.176 Within the next decade, expectations
surrounding pain management crystalized into obligations that could
implicate licensure of institutions and physicians alike. Such obligations
required healthcare organizations to improve their pain management
practices,177 and the Federation of State Medical Boards recommended that
state boards consider sanctioning health professionals who did not
adequately treat pain.178
But pressures from outside and within the medical community did not
immediately translate into better clinical outcomes—owing to pain’s varied
origins and impacts on individual patients.179 Nonetheless, prescription
rates continued to climb, as did the potency of analgesics prescribed.180 The
number of Americans experiencing some form of pain—and expectations
that the medical community tend to their discomfort—became so
widespread that the growing demand for pain care was eventually reflected
in the number of prescriptions being filled.181 By 2012, primary care
physicians, who commonly had a basic understanding of pain management,
produced nearly 49% of all opioid prescriptions.182 During this period,
specialists were also using opioids across a variety of clinical contexts,
ranging from surgical and post-operative care to treat “acute injuries, such
as those due to household, sporting, or motor vehicle accidents.”183
C. Purdue Pharma’s Marketing Practices and the Gateway Theory of
Liability
Recognizing a lucrative market for pain treatment medications, drug
makers pursued a multi-faceted strategy designed to steer demand toward
175
James N. Campbell, APS 1995 Presidential Address, 5 PAIN F. 85 (1996); Natalie E.
Morone & Debra K. Weiner, Pain as the Fifth Vital Sign: Exposing the Vital Need for Pain
Education, 35 CLINICAL THERAPEUTICS 1728 (2013).
176
Andrew E. Lelling, Corporate Accountability for the Opioid Epidemic, 66 DOJ J.
FED. L. & PRAC., Oct. 2018, at 159, 161 (2018); Zettler et al., supra note 159, at 226.
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David W. Baker, The Joint Commission’s Pain Standards: Origins and Evolution,
THE JOINT COMM’N 3 (May 5, 2017), https://www.jointcommission.org/assets/1/6/
Pain_Std_History_Web_Version_05122017.pdf.
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See id. (explaining that in spite of changes in the medical profession, pain has
remained “notoriously difficult to treat,” and discovering appropriate therapies requires an
understanding of “various complex neural circuits involved in different types of pain” that
has so far eluded the medical community).
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their products. Common practices included sending sales representatives to
meet with healthcare providers, issuing samples to patients and their
doctors, funding professional development programs, paying “thought
leaders” to promote drugs, and coordinating with patient advocacy
groups.184 These tactics coincided with myriad institutional pressures on
physicians and healthcare to address their patients’ pain management
demands.
Soon after its 1995 release of an oxycodone product known as
OxyContin, drug maker Purdue emerged to become one of the more
infamous actors in the marketing of analgesics. OxyContin was novel in
that it was an “extended-release” product, which indicated a twelve-hour
dosing schedule at a time when most other products were administered
every four to six hours.185 Between 1996 and 2000, Purdue promoted the
drug in several ways, some of which were hosting more than forty
conferences for a total of 5000 healthcare professionals—including doctors,
nurses and pharmacists—and doubling its sales force.186 Purdue worked
through these marketing strategies to enlist the medical community’s
support for its products while offering assurances that OxyContin could
relieve pain with minimal risk to patients. OxyContin sales subsequently
skyrocketed, growing from $44 million and 316,000 prescriptions in 1996
to more than $1 billion by the year 2000.187 Sales reached $3 billion in
2001–2002 with 14 million issued prescriptions.188 Additionally,
OxyContin prescriptions unrelated to cancer treatments grew from 670,000
to 6.2 million between 1996 and 2002.189 Throughout these time frames,
Purdue’s promotional material maintained the position that OxyContin
posed little to no risk of addiction.190
Increased prescription rates combined with insufficient regard for the
risk of addiction produced tragic effects. Between 1999 and 2018, more
than 232,000 Americans died from prescription opioid overdoses.191 The
oxycodone family of drugs (including OxyContin), along with methadone
and hydrocodone, have been the prescribed opioids mostly commonly
connected to overdose deaths.192 According to the Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention (CDC), deaths from prescription opioids
184
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quadrupled during this same period.193 Despite a steady decline in overall
prescribing rates since 2012, prescription opioids were linked to 32% of
overdose deaths in 2018.194 One possible explanation for this linkage may
be the potency of prescriptions—expressed in morphine milligram
equivalents (MME)—which has increased threefold since 1999.195 In the
face of mounting death tolls and concern from public health experts, Purdue
ceased its marketing practices—by which time it had generated $2.8 billion
in revenue from the sale of OxyContin (between January 1996 and June
2001).196 As early as 2004, lawsuits against Purdue and other defendants
began springing up all over the United States and in Canada.197 The most
notable litigation involved three of Purdue’s senior officers who reached
plea agreements with the Department of Justice. On May 10, 2007,
Purdue’s President and CEO (Michael Fridman), its Chief Legal Officer
(Howard R. Udell), and its Chief Scientific Officer (Dr. Paul Goldenheim)
pled guilty to the introduction of a misbranded drug into interstate
commerce contrary to 21 U.S.C. §§ 331(a), 352(a), and 333(a)(2).
According to the agreed statement of facts:
The Purdue Frederick Company, Inc., and the three executives have
admitted that Purdue fraudulently marketed OxyContin by falsely claiming
that OxyContin was less addictive, less subject to abuse, and less likely to
cause withdrawal symptoms than other pain medications when there was no
medical research to support these claims and without Food and Drug
Administration approval of these claims.198
In addition to paying a $600 million fine to the federal government,
Purdue also entered into a civil settlement, which imposed exclusion from
taking part in federal healthcare programs for twenty-five years.199
As already discussed, tort claims against opioid drug makers are
premised on the “gateway” theory of liability, which is organized around
the idea that opioid prescriptions—regardless of their underlying legitimate
purpose—function as a pathway to other forms of addiction. It presupposes
that opioid prescriptions administered without regard for their addictive
qualities will induce dependency and misuse among patients, who, in turn,
seek other kinds of drugs after being cut off from their original, physician193
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Overdose Death Maps, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION,
https://www.cdc.gov/drugoverdose/data/prescribing/overdose-death-maps.html
195
Id.
196
See Exhibit B to Information, Agreed Statement of Facts, United States v. The Purdue
Frederick Co., Inc. et al., No. 07-00029-JPJ, ECF No. 5-2 (W.D. Va. May 10, 2007).
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supervised opioid doses. This, combined with evidence of deceptive
marketing practices, undoubtedly prompted a great deal of litigation. While
these untested arguments remain the subject of some debate, the CDC’s
three-phase historical narrative of the crisis offers some support to gateway
theorists: the first phase began with a rise in opioid prescriptions in the
1990s; a second was defined by increases in heroin-related overdose deaths,
which began in 2010; and a third was marked by a climb in overdose deaths
involving synthetic opioids—such as fentanyl—beginning in 2013.200
Taken together, these arguments have been central to the legal theory
underlying opioid litigation claims against drug manufacturers.
D. Offshoring OxyContin Revenues and the Rising Tide of Opioid
Litigation
Local governments’ experience with the 1998 Master Settlement
Agreement (MSA) between major tobacco companies and forty-six states
have also shaped current opioid litigation strategy.201 The MSA’s terms
provided that states would receive more than $206 billion over twenty-five
years in what remains the largest civil litigation settlement in history.202
While part of the agreement’s central purpose was to fund programs related
to smoking cessation, litigation proceeds often found their way into general
spending.203 In many states, these proceeds failed to reach local government
agencies on the front lines of public health.204 Anxious to ensure history
would not repeat itself with opioid-related claims, local governments began
filing their own claims against drug makers, producing a large and diverse
plaintiff class.205 While varied among states, counties, cities, and tribal
nations, their claims mimicked a dozen settled state and federal suits that
focused on “overpromotion and diversion.”206 More specifically, they
argued that (i) drug makers downplayed the addictive effects of opioids
while exaggerating their benefits, and (ii) distributors did not have
sufficient controls in place to identify suspicious orders made on behalf of
200
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(several states have challenged this strategy on the basis that political subdivisions lack the
legal authority to represent the people of their state). See Petition for Writ of Mandamus of
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so-called “pill mills” and other heavy subscribers.207
In December of 2017, the United States Judicial Panel on Multidistrict
Litigation (USJPM) determined all claims involved shared questions of
fact, and that it would consolidate and transfer hundreds of federal claims to
the Northern District of Ohio before U.S. District Judge Daniel Polster.208
Additional plaintiffs joined the proceedings and Purdue alone was named in
more than 2600 suits.209 Multidistrict Litigation (MDL) processes aim to
reserve litigants’ resources by preventing duplicative discovery procedures
and conflicting pretrial rulings.210 “Transferred actions not terminated in the
transferee district are remanded to their originating transferor districts by
the Panel at or before the conclusion of centralized pretrial proceedings.”211
These proceedings will often hear representative trials to refine some of the
justiciable issues of interest to all parties.212
After a year of settlement negotiations, Purdue reached a tentative
agreement in September of 2019 “with critical and important constituents”
that would resolve outstanding claims through bankruptcy proceedings.213
In tandem with these proceedings, Purdue proposed a three-part resolution
structure, which it claimed would provide “unprecedented transfer of value
to the American people.”214 These terms provided that:
(1) Purdue’s existing shareholders will relinquish all of their equity
interests in the Debtors and consent to the transfer of all of the Debtors’
assets to a trust or similar post-emergence structure for the benefit of
claimants and the U.S. public, “free and clear” of Purdue’s liabilities to the
fullest extent permitted by law;
(2) Purdue’s existing shareholders will engage in a sale process for
their ex-U.S. pharmaceutical companies; and
(3) Purdue’s existing shareholders will contribute an additional $3
billion over seven years. . .with the hope of substantial further contemplated
contributions from the sales of their ex-U.S. pharmaceutical businesses.215
Purdue’s terms were met with criticism—New York Attorney General
Letitia James called them “insulting” and several states refused to
participate in the settlement.216 Attempting to properly contextualize
207
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proposed settlement amounts, she sought discovery of documents that
would help determine the extent of assets under the control of Purdue and
its beneficial owners—the Sackler family. In September of 2019, court
filings revealed that members of the Sackler family had executed more than
800 wire transfers—representing an aggregate of nearly $1 billion—into
entities in the Channel Islands using Swiss bank accounts and that these
transactions took place as recently as 2018.217 Financial institutions
involved in these transactions included: “Bank of America, N.A., Charles
Schwab & Co., Inc., Citibank, N.A., Goldman Sachs & Co. LLC, HSBC
Bank USA, N.A., J.P. Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., Morgan Stanley & Co.
LLC, UBS Financial Services, Inc., and Wells Fargo.”218 None of the
entities described in these wire transfers appear in Purdue’s organizational
chart attached to the Debtor’s Informational Brief as “Exhibit A.”219 At the
very least, these records suggest Purdue and the Sacklers were trying to
“lowball” plaintiffs to the extent that they were not entirely forthcoming
about the extent of their assets during the course of settlement negotiations.
In a revealing statement to National Public Radio (NPR), a Sackler family
spokesperson insisted, “There is nothing newsworthy about these decadeold transfers, which were perfectly legal and appropriate in every
respect . . . .”220 A clearer picture of these wire transfers subsequently
emerged when auditors discovered the Sackler family had withdrawn more
than $10.7 billion from Purdue since 2008.221 Their timing suggests the
Sacklers accelerated the pace of these transactions in an attempt to protect
most of their wealth at a point in time when there was good reason to
anticipate large-scale litigation.
E. The Failures of “Talking Shop” During the Arc of Time Spanning Wire
Transfers Between Purdue and Its Beneficial Owners
Information surrounding the 2019 release of transactional details
between Purdue and entities controlled by the Sackler family point to a
760688886/new-york-ag-says-sacklers-transferred-millions-from-pharma-accounts-tothemselve [hereinafter Gonzales]; Deanna Paul, N.Y. Attorney General Exposes $1 Billion in
Wire Transfers by Sackler Family, WASH. POST (Sept. 14, 2019, 12:33 PM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2019/09/14/ny-attorney-general-exposes-billionwire-transfers-by-sackler-family/.
217
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(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Oct. 2, 2019) [hereinafter Exhibit 2]. See also Colin Dwyer, Sacklers
Withdrew Nearly $11 Billion From Purdue as Opioid Crisis Mounted, NPR (Dec. 17, 2019,
11:43 AM), https://www.npr.org/2019/12/17/788783876/sacklers-withdrew-nearly-11billion-from-purdue-as-opioid-crisis-mounted [hereinafter Dwyer].
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pattern of wire transfers that began in 1989, if not sooner.222 Financial
institutions readily offered up their services in helping to decapitalize
Purdue during important points in the respective trajectories of private
wealth accumulation, efforts at targeting particular kinds of financial
secrecy, and the FATF’s evolution. The wire transfers at issue in the opioid
story were legal and thus outside the FATF’s remit. This remained the case
after 2007, when Purdue paid a $600 million fine in connection with its
deceptive marketing practices. Whether one accepts the “gateway” theory
of liability or gives more weight to socioeconomics and other determinants
of vulnerability to opioid-induced dependency, Purdue and its beneficial
owners continued profiting from OxyContin sales past the point where
primary and derivative forms of dependency were costing lives.
There is much irony in the profits of this misery passing through
American banking institutions while U.S. regulators worked through the
FATF to develop and enforce recommendations aimed at limiting financial
secrecy out of concern for the common good. There was also a compelling
public interest in the “Purdue-Sackler” wire transfers. Representing more
than just the fruits of misery-making on a large scale, these transactions
reveal a particular set of networked institutional arrangements existing
within a globalizing regulatory landscape where targeting proceeds of crime
and the financing of terrorism became top priorities. Had they been streetlevel drug pushers or terrorists responsible for tens of thousands of deaths,
there is little doubt members of the Sackler family would have been
prosecuted, jailed, and subject to asset seizure. But such moral and legal
calculations change when the “overpromotion and distribution” of highly
addictive drugs operates through skillfully arranged business entities and a
federally regulated drug supply chain. Over the same period of time that
banking institutions were being asked to refine reporting rules that would
help governments seize proceeds of crime, at least a dozen worked with
Purdue’s beneficial owners’ offshore capital under circumstances
substantively adjacent to the FATF’s work.
“Talking shop’s” failures inside the FATF ecosystem extend into the
relationships between America’s national and subnational public actors.
The delegates purporting to represent the country’s interests within
international settings devised regulatory structures to promote financial
transparency in ways that undermined the interests of their state and local
counterparts—counterparts who accounted for most of the plaintiffs suing
Purdue and the Sackler family.223 Put another way, those capable of
leveraging soft law power underperformed at critical moments when they
might have used networked regulation to put restrictions around more
diverse forms of capital flight. Part V reimagines contents of the FATF’s
222
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recommendations and technical guidance documents with these arguments
in mind.
V. PUBLIC INTEREST TRANSACTIONS AND THE BUILDING OF
TRANSNATIONAL REGULATORY STRUCTURES FOR NETWORKS
WITHIN NETWORKS
This Part explains why wire transfers originating from Purdue to its
beneficial owners fall outside the FATF and thus explains the need for
either additional standards or new interpretive guidelines that meaningfully
give effect to the FATF’s mandate.
A. The FATF’s Evolution
There is nothing new or radical in the proposal to refine the
interpretive scope and direction of FATF recommendations. The FATF first
reviewed its mandate in 2004,224 adopted a new surveillance process in
2006,225 and revised its mandate a second time in 2008.226 The FATF also
produced a series of responses following the 2009 meeting of G-20
countries in Pittsburgh, where countries “called on the FATF to improve
transparency and exchange of information” and to issue a list of “high risk
jurisdictions.”227 The following year, the FATF developed guidelines for
insurance companies, cross-border transport of cash and bearer bonds, tax
amnesty laws, and asset repatriation.228 In the same year, it published
reports on free trade zones and their potential vulnerability to misuse for
money laundering or the financing of terrorism.229 The November 2010 G20 Summit in Seoul produced a similar “call and response,” with member
states urging the FATF to “update and implement” FATF standards
pertaining to “transparency of cross-border wire transfers, beneficial
ownership, customer due diligence, and due diligence for ‘politically
exposed persons.’”230 At the G-20 summit in 2016 in Hangzhou, China,
leaders similarly stated their continued support for “protecting the integrity
of the international financial system,” calling on the FATF to “improve the
implementation of the international standards on transparency, including on
the availability of beneficial ownership information of legal persons and
legal arrangements, and its international exchange.”231 The G-20 finance
224
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ministers and central bank governors, who met in July 2013 and November
2015, echoed prior sentiments and refrains, with both events producing
some form of commentary about tackling “the risks raised by opacity of
legal persons and legal arrangements.”232
B. The Ambiguity of the “Purdue-Sackler” Wire Transfers
Properly contextualized, the wire transfers between Purdue and its
beneficial owners (the “Purdue-Sackler” wire transfers) fall outside FATF
scrutiny for reasons that are logical yet problematic. FATF standards that
target the financing of terrorism, for example, recognize the costs
associated with planning, training, travel, and buying any materials used to
carry out attacks.233 Accounting for debates about their efficacy, these
standards seek to disrupt the financing of such activity in the name of
public safety. But these provisions are qualitatively mismatched with
features of the Purdue-Sackler wire transfers. Despite their relationship to
opioid deaths and other forms of large-scale social disruption, their
particular features bear no substantive relationship to “terrorism,” whatever
disagreements persist about how to define the term.234
More complex problems exist within the FATF’s definition of money
laundering: “the processing of . . . criminal proceeds to disguise their illegal
origin.”235 This definition requires that targeted funds have some cognizable
relationship to the commission of a known crime. This framework
precludes a wider conceptualization of money laundering—one that
involves payments routed through offshore jurisdictions and bank accounts
to obscure their provenance or ultimate payee. Whether the Purdue-Sackler
wire transfers constitute proceeds of crime remains unclear. On July 23,
2007, Purdue pled guilty to “misbranding OxyContin, a prescription opioid
pain medication, with the intent to defraud or mislead, a felony under the
federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act.”236 But the order accepting the
guilty plea is silent on the legal treatment of future Purdue proceeds arising
2020).
232
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from opioid sales and limits its chronological focus to the period running
from “December 12, 1995 . . . to on or about June 30, 2001.”237 This
language supports the inference that the $600 million in fines was imposed
for conduct carried out during the same period without expressly capturing
a corresponding time frame for revenues derived from the underlying
crime.
In plea agreements executed in connection with the May 2007
proceedings, the federal prosecutors agreed “there will be no further
criminal prosecution or forfeiture action by the United States for any
violations of law, occurring before May 10, 2007, pertaining to OxyContin
that was the subject matter of the investigation . . . .”238 The benefits of this
undertaking applied to Purdue’s beneficial owners and related entities.239
More recently, the media has reported that Purdue was in talks with the
federal government to resolve ongoing civil and criminal probes as recently
as September 2019.240
C. Confronting the Discordant Interests Among Three Networked
Constituencies
To the extent that the “talking shop” approach to transnational
rulemaking has been underutilized, it also represents an unexplored
opportunity to envision further interpretive changes to FATF standards. The
FATF also expresses its institutional priorities in what it chooses not to do
as a network that places a premium on particular forms of financial
surveillance that accord with its mandate. It has yet to set its sights on how
237
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certain unexamined features of other networked relationships fetter the
fulfillment of its fundamental purpose. The Purdue-Sackler transfers are
problematic because of their ties to the opioid crisis and their ostensibly
legal nature in relation to U.S. law and FATF standards. Moreover, substate actors—such as the governmental opioid plaintiffs—cannot easily
lobby for changes to existing FATF practices or their domestic iterations
under national law without coordinated support from a federal government
whose vague posture vis-a-vis these wire transfers sits uneasily alongside
its antipathy toward multilateral engagement. State and local plaintiffs must
also contend with powerful defendants—mostly members of the influential
pharmaceutical industry whose banking institutions stand ready to provide
the kinds of asset protection strategies at issue in this Article. The PurdueSackler wire transfers are a consequence of these relationships, which
remain outside the reach of the FATF’s purview by virtue of the interface
between existing rules and the asset-protection strategies currently beyond
their reach.
D. Refinements Towards Developing a Public Interest Transaction
Much has been written about the social contract in relation to financial
regulation.241 However construed, its constituent elements must include
regulations that facilitate access to accountability from those who
contribute to social harms on a large scale. In a globalized context, these
elements must also use transnational networks to extend their reach beyond
borders in order to keep pace with the modern realities of capital mobility.
Given their timing and context, the Purdue-Sackler wire transfers offer a
prototypical example of a globalized problem that awaits a globalized
solution. With modest changes, the FATF is best suited to regulate such
capital flows, given its mandate and infrastructure. As a threshold matter,
the FATF should establish a new class of “Public Interest Transaction,”
(PIT) defined as “any transnational movement of capital that represents
earnings directly or indirectly derived from crimes or other practices that
cause substantial harm to the public good and in which there is a
241
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governmental plaintiff.” This definition consists of five core elements,
which can interface with the existing complex of FATF recommendations
and underlying technical manuals to produce outcomes that give fuller
meaning to the institution’s purpose.
1. A Cross-Border Dimension
The PIT framework recognizes a causal relationship between various
public harms, its profiteers, and the financial institutions that help move
resulting profits offshore. This approach complements the language in
FATF Recommendations 24 and 25, which calls for measures to prevent
misuses of “legal persons” and “legal arrangements”, respectively.242 The
outcomes tied to these recommendations envision degrees of access to
information about legal entities and their beneficial owners such that new
types of triggering events will mandate important disclosures regulators
consider useful in tracking PIT-related capital flows.243
2. Standing for Subnational Government
Legislation defining the PIT’s construction of “government” should
expressly contemplate a role for subnational regulators to institute legal
action and enjoy the benefit of coordination with federal regulators such as
FinCEN. Such an outlook is in keeping with classical expressions of
network theory, as expressed in Part II of this Article.244 It also reflects the
notion that transnational networks need not presumptively exclude state
actors at the local or regional levels.245 This iteration of government also
recognizes a particular class of plaintiffs with the standing to advocate for
the public interest in the wake of socially-harmful events occurring at more
localized levels, such as oil spills, collapsed mines, or chemical spills
resulting from derailments.
3. The Perpetual Discoverability and Attachment of Proceeds
FATF member states should legislatively recognize a PIT doctrine that
preserves plaintiffs’ rights to pursue profits of socially-harmful practices
without regard to the timing of regulatory proceedings, be they civil,
criminal, or some hybrid of the two. For example, impugned conduct may
242
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generate proceeds that come to light long after any court proceedings have
concluded. The completion of proceedings should not bar plaintiffs from
pursuing targeted funds so long as they can establish those moneys were
earned from the underlying conduct or otherwise traceable to it—especially
if there is evidence of non-compliance with statutory provisions
promulgated in compliance with FATF Recommendations 24 and 25.
4. An Emphasis on Principles-Based Approaches to Transactional
Scrutiny
Rather than define an exhaustive list of triggering events, legislating a
framework around PITs should be rooted in principles-based regulation.
This approach to financial regulation is well-established and reinforces the
merits of accounting for the limitless scenarios that may warrant
government action while still building a sustainable and effective
compliance culture among regulees.246 It is a form of “flexible regulation”
that favors a context-dependent paradigm rather than a prescriptive model
of rulemaking.247 One scholar aptly described it as integrating “community
norms, individual morality, market forces, market or media pressure, and
any other forces that can help strengthen the arm of regulation.”248 In the
PIT context, this principle sidesteps complications that arise where
otherwise problematic transactions fall outside a fixed set of prohibited
activities despite engaging concerns that warrant regulatory intervention.
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E. Reimagining a Different Approach to the Purdue-Sackler Wire
Transfers
The Purdue-Sackler wire transfers occurred over a period of time
when the rising prospect of litigation stemming from Purdue’s role in the
opioid crisis created a strong incentive to place assets offshore as a
protective strategy. Once the PIT model is embedded into the FATF’s
existing body of recommendations and member countries’ laws, it is worth
contemplating their corresponding impact on the regulatory calculus
surrounding these transactions. The goal is to imagine a different course of
events in how financial institutions behave both in relation to Purdue’s
assets and reimagined laws in FATF member countries.
Once public health experts began sounding the alarm about opioid
deaths from different parts of the United States, local authorities would
have started investigating the source of the problem. These efforts would
have uncovered information about actors within the drug supply chain,
including their legal structures and beneficial owners. The five federal249
and four state agencies250 engaged in the investigations preceding Purdue’s
2007 guilty plea are evidence that sufficient statutory authority for
interagency cooperation exists to support the language in FATF
Recommendation 31.251 The fruits of this cooperation should generate, at a
minimum, information outlining the nature of the underlying public interest
problem, the actors involved, the structure of their business entities, and a
notice of intent to commence legal proceedings. Parties named in these
investigations should receive notice of any submissions and be afforded the
opportunity to comment.
Pending any further decisions as to the disposition of seized funds,
federal regulators should ask entities named in any investigation to disclose
beneficial owners, all domestic and offshore entities under their control, and
information confirming the names of their respective financial institutions.
These disclosures should be reviewed against information from the Internal
Revenue Service. The named financial institutions should provide all
records generated in the ordinary course of compliance with existing FATF
requirements and comparator provisions under American law. The most
relevant provisions govern customer due diligence,252 record keeping,253
249
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correspondent banking,254 and wire transfers.255 The targeted entity’s assets
should be subject to a form of asset seizure once originating jurisdictions
can establish their connection to a cognizable and sufficiently described
harm. Any subsequent filings generated in connection with the cross-border
movement of funds deemed to be proceeds of the PIT should require banks
to freeze any further outbound capital flows consistent with the U.S.
statutory equivalent of FATF Recommendation 4, pending resolution of any
outstanding legal claims to such funds.256 Existing mutual legal assistance
commitments with relevant foreign jurisdictions (in accordance with FATF
Recommendations 37 and 38) should complement these asset freezes.257
The foregoing framework offers two important benefits. First, it
prevents beneficial owners from strategically decapitalizing defendant
businesses at points in time when their conduct has produced the kinds of
harms that engage public interest. Linking this restraint to a principlesbased framework that considers “community norms, individual morality,
market forces, market or media pressure, and any other forces” engenders a
compliance culture that need not be at odds with regulatory certainty.258 The
second advantage revolves around the contours of litigation settlement
negotiations, which would shift once a clearer picture of the defendant’s
assets was known and was within the plaintiff’s reach. This would have
undoubtedly had an impact on Purdue’s fall 2019 offer to pay a $3 billion
settlement and relinquish control of its entities, which assumed a
qualitatively different meaning once the extent to which their
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Id. at 10. (Recommendation 4, Confiscation and Provisional Measures reads:
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measures, to enable their competent authorities to freeze or seize and confiscate the
following, without prejudicing the rights of bona fide third parties: (a) property laundered,
(b) proceeds from, or instrumentalities used in or intended for use in money laundering or
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for use in, the financing of terrorism, terrorist acts or terrorist organisations, or (d) property
of corresponding value. Confiscation and provisional measures * Such measures should
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confiscation; (b) carry out provisional measures, such as freezing and seizing, to prevent any
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requiring a criminal conviction (non-conviction based confiscation), or which require an
offender to demonstrate the lawful origin of the property alleged to be liable to confiscation,
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decapitalization strategy came into clearer focus.259 Both of these
advantages reinforce what should be an important element of the social
contract—one that gives communities meaningful access to redress
mechanisms while encouraging better practices among regulees.
VI. CONCLUSION
The FATF’s historical trajectory demonstrates how the “talking shop”
framework has the capacity to produce transnational frameworks whose
outcomes can find their way into expressions of hard law. Despite pressures
to broaden its mandate, the fettering of its power and leaving certain
problematic forms of asset mobility unaddressed continues to undermine its
mission. Admittedly, PITs are unlike terrorism and entail different
formulations of risk and psychological impact that prompt rapid
institutional responses.
But there is a vital role for soft law in helping to connect this new
concept to existing recommendations and standards to produce an outcome
that better represents the FATF’s original purpose. Regulators should
address demands for covert movements of capital mobility that represent
profits traceable to a limitless range of events, including environmental or
air disasters, financial crises, the politicized depletion of national treasuries,
and general corruption.
As long as governments fail to take action on this front, they will
preserve the opportunism that continues to make secrecy jurisdictions
attractive options for those who profit from catastrophic events in ways that
destroy our social fabric. Properly deployed, “talking shop” can generate
the soft law that emerges from transnational networks to generate consensus
and offer concrete, domestic solutions in the hope of preventing such
destruction.
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